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instance, while Graham suggests that
China’s Song diesel submarine program
may have “fail[ed] . . . to develop ac-
cording to schedule,” it is now note-
worthy the extent to which Song
development appears to have pro-
gressed in parallel to China’s importing
of Kilo diesel submarines from Russia.
Graham projects that SLOC security
will continue to preoccupy Japanese
planners as a fundamental national
concern. He breaks significant ground
by showing that Japanese policy mak-
ers, motivated by increasingly “realist”
threat perceptions, are exploring new
directions in the pursuit of SLOC secu-
rity. The extent to which these emerg-
ing impulses can transcend funding
constraints (imposed increasingly by
demographic and economic challenges)
and constitutional limitations (still pro-
tected, to some degree, by domestic
politics) remains a pivotal question for
all concerned with East Asian security.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON
Naval War College
Johnson, Stephen P. Silent Steel: The Mysterious
Death of the Nuclear Sub USS Scorpion. Hobo-
ken, N.J.: Wiley, 2006. 292pp. $25.95
Several years ago I received a phone call
from Stephen Johnson asking about my
service on the USS Scorpion (SSN 589),
my first ship, between the fall of 1961
and the winter of 1962. He explained he
was writing a book about its loss in late
May 1968 with its entire crew of ninety-
nine. I spoke with him at some length
and sent some material about the vast
“SubSafe” program changes that oc-
curred within the Submarine Force af-
ter the loss of USS Thresher (SSN 593)
in April 1963. Silent Steel is the exqui-
sitely researched result of my tiny input
and that of more than 230 others—
ranging from the widows of Scorpion
sailors, submarine design engineers and
naval architects, and a list of active-
duty and retired personnel that reads
like a “who’s who” of the then and now
Submarine Force. The bibliography it-
self spans two dozen pages of applicable
books, journal articles, official reports,
memorandums, and other miscella-
neous correspondence.
Anyone expecting to find a clear and
unambiguous set of events and circum-
stances that “explain” the Scorpion’s
loss will be disappointed. Rather, along
with fascinating personal insights into
some key players, the reader will find
erudite and technically credible discus-
sions on the facts and assumptions of
any number of popular and not so pop-
ular theories. For example, his dispas-
sionate and objective examination of
much of the same material that was
available to formal Navy courts of in-
quiry virtually rules out any concept of
“hostile action” and substantially weak-
ens the plausibility of incidents involv-
ing the ship’s own torpedoes. He subtly
chides some advocates for having
drawn three-significant-figure conclu-
sions from one-significant-figure as-
sumptions. In addition, by bluntly
describing some bureaucratic foibles
and tragic administrative decisions
(such as shortchanging Scorpion’s
SubSafe package during a 1967 refuel-
ing overhaul to save money), Johnson’s
work leads one to perceive that—as is
true in virtually all submarine disasters
that we know something about—there
had to have been some series of compli-
cating, cascading events that over-
whelmed any efforts by the crew to bring
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the (perhaps minor) initiating casualty
under control. For those who delight in
finding small technical mistakes, there
are a few, if one looks closely enough—
for example, the Scorpion’s fire control
system was not a Mark 113 but a vin-
tage Mark 101. But none detracts from
the overall high quality of the investiga-
tive effort.
Even without a specific “cause célèbre”
event to dissect and review for “lessons
learned,” Silent Steel provides much to
think about for anyone interested in or
involved with combating casualties at sea.
There is even some consolation, how-
ever small in comparison to the loss of
life, in the knowledge that the United
States has come to realize to a signifi-
cant degree in the years since that “ma-
terial readiness is a consumable”; we are
reluctant to run ships (and people) as
hard as we did in the early to mid-1960s.
When I rode Scorpion, it averaged more
than three hundred days a year at sea.
Today, even with dwindling platform
resources, the Submarine Force has be-
gun to say no to many of the increasing
operational requirements from senior
regional and national commanders.
JAMES H. PATTON, JR.
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Keefer, Edward C., ed. Foreign Relations of the
U.S.: Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, vol. 6.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2006. 1,173pp. $65
This State Department volume, the first
of five that will cover the end period of
the Vietnam War, documents major
foreign policy issues of the Nixon ad-
ministration, with a focus on U.S. pol-
icy toward Vietnam, Cambodia, and to
a lesser extent Laos during the period of
January 1969 to July 1970. What a time
it was!
In the 1968 presidential campaign, can-
didate Richard M. Nixon stated that he
had a plan to end the war in Vietnam.
As it turned out, the “plan” was embry-
onic. When he took office he moved
slowly, convinced that how the United
States ended the war would have an en-
during impact on future American for-
eign policy. Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s
national security adviser, became the
key figure in the effort to end the war, a
program that became known as
“Vietnamization.”
Vietnamization was directed toward the
upgrading of South Vietnamese forces,
which was to be accompanied by
phased withdrawals of U.S. forces.
Completion would depend on how
things went in Vietnam. This work, in
addition to documenting policy efforts
to move this program along, also docu-
ments efforts to convince Hanoi that it
was dealing with a strong adversary: for
example, secret U.S. bombing of Cam-
bodia, integration of the secret war in
Laos with the conflict in Vietnam, and
covert operations against North
Vietnam.
One of the principal themes developed
here is the search for a negotiated settle-
ment, first in the Paris Peace Talks and
then through secret meetings between
Kissinger and North Vietnamese foreign
minister Xuan Thuy and special adviser
Le Duc Tho. Here, and throughout the
book, Kissinger’s memorandums to
Nixon are the key documents. Many ap-
pear in Kissinger’s memoirs; however, in
this work they are more complete.
In March 1970, Cambodia’s Norodom
Sihanouk was overthrown by the Lon
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